and other commanders who argue that the counterinsurgency struggle in Iraq must be pursued as the military's top priority and ultimately resolved on U.S. terms.
Let me follow up with some more comments on the promotions of General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno to head U.S. Central Command and U.S. operations in Iraq, respectively. I am doing so because I think these promotions are very interesting on at least three levels: (i) military operations in Iraq; (ii) inside the Pentagon; and (iii) the possible political implications, both for the new President in January of 2009 and, more immediately, for the Presidential election in November.
1.
As I mentioned in my prior post, these appointments mean that Bush is going to continue Petraeus’s counterinsurgency ("COIN") strategy in Iraq through the end of his term. Continuing COIN in Iraq, especially with Petraeus and Odierno in charge, means our troop levels will probably not be reduced much, if at all, after the surge is over. The force level in Iraq will probably be close to the pre-surge level through the end of Bush’s term.
As Robert Kaplan said, the resignation of Admiral William Fallon as head of Centcom probably had less to do with differences between Bush and Fallon on Iran (which is the reason that most of the media cited as the reason for Fallon’s resignation) and more to do with disagreements between Petraeus and Fallon, who as head of Centcom was Petraeus’s boss, over troop levels in Iraq. Fallon wanted to cut troop levels in Iraq, and Petraeus did not. Now Fallon is gone and Petraeus is in charge. That means the troop levels will probably not decrease that much once we get back down to the pre-surge level.
Also, with Petraeus heading Centcom and Odierno back in Iraq, not only will the COIN strategy continue in Iraq, but we can also feel confident generals who really know how to implement COIN successfully will be in charge. This is one of the best signs we can have for continued success in Iraq over the next eight-plus months.
2.
In the long run, the promotions, especially Petraeus’s, may mean even more in the Pentagon than in Iraq. While the Presidential candidates have been going around stating and re-stating what everybody knows are their positions on Iraq, a much more interesting debate has been going on in the Pentagon.
At times, for people who are not in the armed forces or who do not have experience in or with the military, the military seems like a monolith, and all soldiers seem the same. This is far from the truth. For example, while many people think General Petraeus has done a great job in Iraq (I do) with his COIN strategy and manpower surge, there are lots of people in the military who do not agree with General Petraeus or his COIN strategy.
For example, there are plenty of generals who argue that we need to reduce our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They say that the surge has put too big of a strain on the Army and Marines and that we cannot continue to maintain 140,000 troops in Iraq (plus those in Afghanistan) after the surge is over. The continuing deployments and redeployments to Iraq and Afghanistan are putting too big of a strain on the Army and Marines. It is too much to expect of the men and women in the Army and Marines and their families back home. We are exhausting the troops and ruining the Army. General Richard A. Cody, the Army’s out-going vice chief of staff, told Congress that the deployments are putting "incredible stress" on the soldiers and their families and that they pose "a significant risk" to the all-volunteer military.
But it just wasn’t the strain on individuals that Cody talked about. "When the five-brigade surge went in … that took all the stroke out of the shock absorbers for the United States Army," Cody told Congress. "I’ve never seen our lack of strategic depth be where it is today."
According to The Washington Post:
"Cody said that the Army no longer has fully ready combat brigades on standby should a threat or conflict occur.
The nation needs an airborne brigade, a heavy brigade and a Stryker brigade ready for ‘full-spectrum operations,’ Cody said, ‘and we don’t have that today.
Soldiers and Marines also lack training for major combat operations using their entire range of weapons, the generals [i.e., Cody and Marine Corps General Robert Magnus] said. For example, artillerymen are not practicing firing heavy guns but are instead doing counterinsurgency work as military police."
Also, there is the question of what kind of conflict the armed forces should be preparing to fight. Jim Hoagland in The Washington Post describes the debate going on in the Pentagon:
"On one side are the ‘fight-win guys,’ as some describe themselves. They are led by Gen. David Petraeus
In this view, the Middle East is the most likely arena for future conflicts, and Iraq is the prototype of the war that U.S. forces must be trained and equipped to win.
Arrayed against them are the uniformed chiefs of the military services who foresee a ‘broken army’ emerging from an all-out commitment to Iraq that neglects other needs and potential conflicts. It is time to rebuild Army tank battalions, Marine amphibious forces and other traditional instruments of big-nation warfare -- while muddling through in Iraq."
Here is a key question for the future of our military: Should the armed forces be training to fight more conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq, where counterinsurgency doctrine will be what it takes to prevail or should we focus on "big-nation warfare," with tanks and sophisticated fighter jets and Marine amphibious forces? Is the enemy in the future more likely to look like what we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan today or what we fought in Korea and would have fought in Western Europe but for the deterrent success of NATO?
After Vietnam, the Army turned its back on the lessons that were learned in the four years General Creighton Abrams led our forces there. America wanted to forget about Vietnam, and so did the military. Similarly, today there are plenty of generals and admirals who do not think Petraeus’s COIN strategy is what the military should be focusing on in the future. They favor preparation for what General Cody called "full spectrum warfare," and they worry about our readiness for that kind of warfare. They think we need to focus on the kind of wars we trained for in the 1980s, with tanks and big units fighting each other in traditional-style battles.
With Bush’s promotion of General Petraeus, it would appear that Bush and Defense Secretary Gates may be putting their weight behind Petraeus’s view. It would be interesting to know what the Presidential candidates think about this issue, though I doubt any of them (except one) has given it any thought, assuming they even realize it is an issue.
3.
Which brings me to the possible political implications of these appointments. I briefly mentioned this in my prior post, but let me go into more detail here. First, though, let me say that I do not think President Bush considered the political implications in making these appointments. President Bush is doing what he thinks is the best for the war in Iraq, and my guess is that he does not care what it means politically.
But the promotions do have political implications. First, assume the promotions get approved by the Senate. That means Petraeus will be in Centcom and Odierno will be in Iraq when the new President takes over in January. Obviously, if McCain wins, it is no big deal, but what if Clinton or Obama win? How will either of them like the advice that they are likely to get from Petraeus and Odierno? Both Obama and Clinton have pretty much made up their minds on Iraq, and neither of them seems particularly interested in letting the facts or changes on the ground in Iraq affect their view. They have both said they are going to get out and get out quickly. So what are they going to do if the generals with the most knowledge about what is really happening in Iraq, militarily, give them different advice? Will the new President remove them? They would have just been approved by the Senate and now they would be removed.
On the other side, if the new President directs Petraeus and/or Odierno to do something that they totally disagree with, what will Petraeus and Odierno do? Will they resign? What would the political implications be if generals, who are perceived by many as doing a good job in Iraq, resigned instead of implementing a new policy set by Clinton or Obama? The "out now" crowd wouldn’t mind, but they don’t agree that Petraeus and Odierno have done a good job in Iraq. But what about middle America? I’m not talking about those who have supported everything Bush did in Iraq. I’m talking about those who thought Iraq was going badly but didn’t want America to lose and were happy Petraeus and Odierno turned it around. I’m talking about those who have been glad to see things get better in Iraq and would like to see us succeed. What would they say?
But, as I mentioned in the update to my earlier post, I wonder if Petraeus and Odierno will even get confirmed? I read that the Bush Administration talked with Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, who is the head of the Armed Services committee in the Senate, and he promised prompt hearings. But Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid may have different ideas. His statement, which I linked to in my prior post, gave no assurance of any kind of prompt hearings. In fact, it read more like the kind of thing the Democrats say when they are planning to delay some judicial nomination for a couple of years.
Certainly, one way to make sure that a President Obama or Clinton does not have the political problem I mentioned above, would be to not confirm the nominations. You don’t have to vote them down. All you have to do is give them the old "things take time/we are busy with other pressing matters/detailed hearings are required" answer on timing. Then ask for detailed information from President Bush and the Department of Defense that would be objected to by any president on executive privilege grounds and say you cannot hold hearings until you get the information. Also, not voting means that neither Clinton nor Obama would have to vote on something that, if they voted one way, would drive the leftwing netroots crazy and that, if they voted the other way, could raise big questions for the moderates they need to win in November.
But, and this was point of the update to my prior post, how is it going to look to delay the vote or to not vote at all. We are in a war. Most people think Generals Petraeus and Odierno have done a good job (regardless of how they felt about Iraq before these two guys took over). It is one thing to delay a hearing on some Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The person just goes on as Acting Assistant Secretary. It isn’t great, but nobody is going to die.
But we are not talking about HUD or the Department of Education here. We’re talking war. How is going to look to not vote on the men who have been nominated to lead our troops in war? Is it okay to force Odierno to go on as Acting head of our troops in Iraq or have Petraeus be Acting head of Centcom?
What does that tell the other side? What does it tell our soldiers risking their lives in Afghanistan and Iraq? Exactly how is that "supporting the troops"?
Even though I don’t think Bush made these appointments for political purposes (he just doesn’t care about that kind of stuff any more), he has created an interesting dilemma for the Democrats and a possible big issue for John McCain.
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