Earlier this week David Ignatius wrote about a new "post-surge" strategy that is under discussion within the Bush Administration. The basics of the plan were outlined in what Ignatius saw as a trial balloon testing whether it would be possible to get bipartisan support from Congress and the American people for this new policy. Unfortunately, this post-surge policy is as depressing as my prior post was hopeful. Let me comment on this new policy by responding to excerpts from Ignatius’s article:
"The revamped policy, as outlined by a top administration official, would be premised on the idea that, as the current surge of U.S. troops succeeds in reducing sectarian violence, America's role will be increasingly to help prepare the Iraqi military to take greater responsibility for securing the country."
It is not a matter of just "reducing sectarian violence" once. We have to get it down and keep it down, and that requires continuing the anti-insurgency tactics we have just started to use. It takes time. If we quit too soon, we will waste all of our efforts.
"‘Sectarian violence is not a problem we can fix,’ said one senior official. ‘The Iraqi government needs to show that it can take control of the capital.’"
You can say we cannot fix sectarian violence, but the fact is providing security is exactly what General Petraeus’s anti-insurgency tactics are all about. Providing security, whether from anti-sectarian violence or anything else, is what we are trying to do.
While the Iraqis need to take control of Baghdad, they cannot do it yet. Just because they have to do it in the future, does not mean they can do it today. While we should not do things for the Iraqi forces that they can do for themselves, we must not ask them to do things before they are ready. We tried that before. It failed, and it put us farther behind than we were when we started.
"The new policy would seek to anchor future Iraqi security in a regional structure that would be a continuation of the "neighbors" talks begun earlier this month at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh. To make that structure work, the administration is talking with Iran and Syria in what officials hope will become a serious dialogue about how to stabilize Iraq."
This is the old "lets-get-Iran-and-Syria-to-help-us" idea. In case you haven’t noticed, the Iranian government hates us. We encouraged the Lebanese people kick the Syrians out of Lebanon. We are trying to show Bashir Assad was involved in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Why would either of these countries want to help us? How does chaos in Iraq hurt them?
"Here's the summary the senior official provided of the policy he said is under discussion:
-- Train Iraqi security forces and support them as they gain sufficient intelligence, logistics and transport capability to operate independently."
Of course we want the Iraqi forces to do this, but expecting them to operate independently before they are ready to do so will result in disaster. It takes time to train an army. It takes even longer to train officers. You can’t do it faster just because you want to.
"-- Continue Special Forces operations against al-Qaeda, in the hope of gradually reducing suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks on the Iraqi government. ‘That's the accelerator for sectarian violence,’ said one official."
This sounds like going back to the old "search and destroy" tactics. They did not work in Vietnam. They did not work in Iraq the first time we tried them, and they won’t work in the future. What works is using proper anti-insurgency tactics to provide security for the population.
"-- Focus U.S. activities on the two big enemies of stability and democracy in Iraq -- al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed sectarian militias."
Ditto.
"In addition, the new Centcom commander, Adm. William Fallon, has publicly stated his view that the surge strategy is just "chipping away at the problem" and that ‘reconciliation isn't likely in the time we have available.’"
If Fallon is right, then it may be hopeless.
"The wild cards in this new effort to craft a bipartisan Iraq policy are the Republican and Democratic leaders, President Bush and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. They both say they want a sustainable, effective Iraq policy, but each is deeply entrenched in a partisan version of what that policy should be. America is in a nosedive in Iraq. Can these two leaders share the controls enough that Iraq will become a U.S. project, rather than George Bush's war? There's a bipartisan path out of this quagmire, but will America's leaders be wise enough to take it?"
It looks like what they are trying to do is to come up with a policy that will "work" in Washington. Then, since it works in Washington, they are going to follow it in Iraq, even though we have absolutely no reason to believe it will succeed there. What we need to do is to figure out what will actually work in Iraq (which is what General Petraeus is trying to do). Then we have to either do it or admit that we are going to lose. It is not a matter of Bush and Pelosi agreeing. Bush doesn’t seem to know, and Pelosi doesn’t care, as long as she can blame it on Bush. We don’t need a policy that works in Washington. We need a policy that works in Baghdad and Anbar province and Kirkuk and Basra. General Petraeus is trying to do that. This new policy will not.
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