Here is a question that should be asked of all people running for President, whether Democrat or Republican: Have you read at least the forewards and introduction to the new U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual?* I know this question sounds sort of silly, but it is not. Traditional U.S. military doctrine has emphasized force protection and the use of firepower over the use of manpower. Our desire has been to protect the lives of our Soldiers and Marines to the greatest extent possible. We have used planes and artillery, bombs and shells, instead of risking the lives of our people. In many of the wars we have fought, it has worked. The problem is, as we have seen in Iraq (and others have seen elsewhere), this approach does not work when you are fighting an insurgency. In fact, in fighting insurgencies, an overemphasis on firepower is counterproductive. Therefore, the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual sets forth a new doctrine and new tactics for fighting insurgencies. But this Manual says some hard things for our Soldiers and Marines: "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. Ultimate success in COIN [counterinsurgency] is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force." "The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted. … Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people." "Sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction."** Sarah Sewall sums it up in her introduction: "Just as an additional moment for target identification could save a civilian life, so might that momentary hesitation prove deadly to the Soldier. The COIN mission creates more than just a complex ethical environment; it fundamentally challenges U.S. views of force protection. The [COIN] doctrine explains why increased tactical risks can reduce strategic risk for U.S. forces. … Thus, short-term losses can yield success more rapidly and efficiently." Today’s enemy insurgent’s tactics and strategy have forced additional risk upon the American Soldier and Marine. It is unquestionably unfair, for the enemy is violating longstanding rules of war. … Yet the answer is unavoidable. … Because the civilian is fundamental to the COIN mission, force protection must now give way."*** In other words, the only way to successfully fight an insurgency involves more personal risk to our Soldiers and Marines. Instead of dropping bombs from 30,000 feet (as we did in Serbia in 1998), our Soldiers and Marines in Iraq are going to have to take more risk and accept more danger to get the job done. To succeed in Iraq we are going to have to ask our Soldiers and Marines to follow a doctrine that means, in the short run, more of them will get hurt and more of them will get killed. This is something each and every Presidential candidate needs to think about and understand. The whole manual does not need to be read, but the forewards and introduction do. They give the essence of the manual, and they total less than 50 pages. It would not take long. When the Congress voted to support President Bush’s Iraq policy in October 2002, some of those now running for President apparently did not have enough time to read the confidential documents about Iraq. They need to find the time to read this. Other candidates may say they did not want to go into Iraq and we ought to get out, so it is not necessary for them to read it. If they won’t read it for Iraq, they need to personally read it for next time – because there will be one. This new doctrine is asking a lot of our Soldiers and Marines. We need to ask our Presidential candidates to spend a little bit of time reading it. ----------------------- ** Sections 1-149, 1-151 and 1-152. *** Pages xxviii and xxix.
* I am referring to the University of Chicago Press edition. The forwards are by Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl and by General David H. Petraeus and Lt. General James F. Amos. The introduction is by Sarah Sewall.
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