A Few More Thoughts on Afghanistan

In Sunday’s Washington Post, Jim Hoagland gave what may be a preview of President Obama’s policy on Afghanistan, which is to be rolled out (to use Mr. Hoagland’s phrase) starting this week. Let me comment on several of the things Mr. Hoagland said. (The excerpts from Mr. Hoagland’s article are indented.)

"According to U.S. and foreign officials, Petraeus – the regional commander for the Afghan and Iraqi theaters – persuaded the president last month that sending 17,000 new soldiers to Afghanistan will enable U.S. and allied commanders to reduce their reliance on the airstrikes and special forces' raids that have inflicted growing civilian casualties and provoked bitter outbursts from President Hamid Karzai."

This is an important point, and I am glad President Obama agreed to it. Airstrikes and special forces’ raids can kill terrorist leaders, but they also wind up killing lots of innocent civilians, too. They often create more enemies than they kill. With more troops on the ground, we can limit our reliance on airstrikes and raids. One other thing: I don’t care about President Hamid Karzai’s complaints as much I do the people of Afghanistan. Fewer of these strikes and raids will help us convince the Afghanis we are there to protect them, not kill them as collateral damage.

"Petraeus would also apply in Afghanistan another feature of the surge strategy that he championed in Iraq's Anbar province. U.S. intelligence estimates that only 5 percent of the Taliban are ‘hard core’ ideologues sympathetic to al-Qaeda, and Petraeus wants a significant outreach by provincial Afghan officials and the U.S. officers who work with them to the ‘recoverable’ Taliban."

Petraeus has an excellent idea here. One caution, though: David Kilcullen, an Australian army reservist and adviser to General Petraeus in Iraq, notes that "[i]f the Taliban sees that we’re negotiating for a stay of execution or to stave off defeat, that’s going to harden their resolve." In Iraq, President Bush made it clear we were not merely trying to stave off defeat. Whether President Obama’s administration – and his party – will convey a similar message of commitment in Afghanistan is unclear.

"The general acknowledges the great differences between the two countries. But his recent success in Iraq seems to drive his approach in Afghanistan. Holbrooke brings a different perspective, having experienced success in the Balkans but also having absorbed as a young diplomat the failure of pacification and counterinsurgency in Vietnam."

Mr. Hoagland both underestimates General Petraeus and is wrong when he talks about the failure of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. During our first three to four years in Vietnam (from 1965 to 1968), we did not try counterinsurgency. We used General William Westmoreland’s big unit/"search and destroy"/body count strategy. It was only when General Creighton Abrams took over in 1968 that we started to employ a proper counterinsurgency strategy. Unfortunately, by the time General Abrams’ "One War" strategy started to have some success, we were already on the way out and the strategy did not have time to succeed.*

If Richard Holbrooke thinks pacification and counterinsurgency "failed" in Vietnam, as opposed to not succeeding because the United States was leaving no matter what, then it is Mr. Holbrooke who has not absorbed the complicated history of our time in Vietnam. General Petraeus did his doctoral dissertation on the lessons of Vietnam. He understands both sides of the Vietnam experience, both where we had success and where we failed.

"All through the Afghan strategic review the ghosts of Vietnam have been tugging at the sleeves of some of the president's advisers, while others have focused on the (still fragile) stabilization of Iraq."

"[T]he ghosts of Vietnam" are truly President Obama’s Achilles heel when it comes to Afghanistan. Too many Democrats see Vietnam whenever they look at the possibility of sending our military overseas. We have gotten smarter since then. It took a while, but we have learned the lessons of Vietnam, and we can, if we want to, avoid the mistakes of Vietnam.

"The 'minimalist' camp, which includes Vice President Biden and the review's coordinator, Bruce Riedel, argued for modest goals -- essentially an Afghanistan that is not a base for international terrorism."

As John McCain’s and Joe Lieberman said in their article in The Washington Post last Thursday (and as I said here), the minimalist approach will not work – because the Afghanis won’t help us if we are not going to help protect them. You beat insurgencies with intelligence. You get intelligence from people. People will give you intelligence if you make a credible commitment to be there to protect them. The problem is too many of the veterans of the anti-Vietnam war left seem unwilling to make such a commitment.

"Holbrooke seems to have been in the middle. …

The arguments have been serious and intense enough for Obama to have delayed a decision beyond his original mid-March deadline …. When the strategy emerges, it is likely to be a synthesis that moves everyone toward a middle ground. That is the other thing about smart operators: They also know when they have to bridge differences and get to work."

If Mr. Hoagland is saying that President Obama is trying to come down in the middle, then we are in trouble. An approach of "some of this, some of that" may work in a Chinese restaurant, but it is not what we need in Afghanistan. President Obama needs to go with what will work on the ground in Afghanistan, not try to "synthesize" some middle ground designed mostly to make people in Washington happy.

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* For more discussion on General Westmoreland’s strategy in Vietnam versus General Abrams’, see here and other posts in the category "Vietnam".