Tomorrow is the twentieth anniversary of the only free election in the history of the German Democratic Republic. On March 18, 1990, East Germans were allowed to vote freely for the first time, and they did, voting, in effect, for reunification with West Germany, which happened on October 3, 1990.
The speed and peacefulness with which Germany reunited was incredible. But changes of similar magnitude were happening across central and eastern Europe as the 1990s turned into the 2000s. On March 12, 1999, less than ten years after the Berlin Wall came down, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO. Until 1990, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were part of the USSR. On March 29, 2004, they, too, became a part of NATO. Look at the list of the countries that have joined NATO since the Wall fell:
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Bulgaria
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Albania
Croatia
Mind-boggling.
Throughout the twentieth century, Europe was the main center of conflict in the world. In the first half, it was the Great War and then World War II. In the second half, it was the 40-year Cold War, with a constant threat of nuclear annihilation.
But in the last decade of the last century, peace spread over Europe, and except for the country that was Yugoslavia, it happened almost without bloodshed. It was a magnificent success.
And that success has, to a large degree, continued in the 2000s. Certainly, there have been problems. Things are still not fully settled in parts of the Balkans. The development of democracy in some of the countries has not always been easy and without difficulties. There was even the war in Georgia, on the outer edge of Europe, in 2008.
But for anybody who remembers the ‘60s and ‘70s and into the ‘80s, the progress in Europe has been incredible. For the first time in I don’t know how long, nobody can realistically see a war happening in Europe. As I said above, mind-boggling.
But as often happens, no matter how great a success, eventually questioners and naysayers begin to appear. All of the successes are assumed; of course, they were going to happen. There was no doubt about them. But look at the additional things that could have happened. If we had only done this differently or gone about that in another way, we could have avoided the problems we have today. Instead of seeing the successes, they look only at the things that they think could have been better.
The author of 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, Mary Elise Sarotte wonders whether the United States and West Germany misled Mikhail Gorbachev as to their plans for Germany and NATO if the USSR (as it still was then) agreed to a reunified Germany staying in NATO. Did the US and West Germany lead Mr. Gorbachev to believe that, while Germany would re-unite, NATO would not expand into East German territory (and beyond), as some Russian leaders claim now?
Ms. Sarotte writes (in an article in The New York Times):
"Did the United States betray Russia at the dawn of the post-cold war era? The short answer is no. Nothing legally binding emerged from the negotiations over German unification. In fact, in September 1990, an embattled Mr. Gorbachev signed the accords that allowed NATO to extend itself over the former East Germany in exchange for financial assistance from Bonn to Moscow. A longer answer, however, shows that there were mixed messages and diplomatic ambiguities."
Many of us would look at Europe today. We see freedom and democracies across a continent that for most of the twentieth century knew war and tyranny. NATO, which is probably the greatest alliance for peace in the world’s history, expanded for 16 countries in 1989 to 28 countries today, and with that spread, the security of peace spread, too.
But Ms. Sarotte focuses on the problems in Russia and the grievances and resentments that some in Russia feel toward the West in general and the United States in particular.
According to Ms. Sarotte, "Mr. Gorbachev later complained to Mr. Kohl that he had fallen into a trap [regarding the expansion of NATO into not only East Germany but also Eastern Europe]." And as for the money that the Soviet Union/Russia got from West Germany:
"Gorbachev would complain to [U.S. Secretary of State James] Baker in 1991 that the money from Kohl had already vanished: ‘Things disappear around here. We got a lot of money for German unification, and when I called our people, I was told they didn’t know where it was.’ … Clearly, Moscow needed more than just credits to ease its transition to being a modern market economy, but (other than from Bonn) it got little."
And so Ms. Sarotte suggests the following:
"By acknowledging that there might be some substance to Russian grievances, the Obama administration would strengthen our relations with Moscow. Given that NATO enlargement has already taken place (and efforts for further expansion are stalled), little would be lost with such an acknowledgment but much could be gained. Certainly, Western attempts to manage everything from Iran’s nuclear program to European energy supplies during the coming winter would be a great deal easier with Russia’s cooperation."
Ms. Sarotte is wrong for several reasons. First, there is nothing to apologize for. Look at what was accomplished. Look at the freedom and democracy – and peace – that has spread across Europe in the last two decades and look at the chances of war that are no longer there. This is a huge accomplishment. It is unfortunate that Russia did not use its chances as well as it could have. But what is there to object to if a country like the USSR does not dominate big swaths of Europe? If this is Russia’s grievance, why should we care?
Second, Ms. Sarotte says, "Given that NATO’s enlargement has already taken place, little would be lost with such an acknowledgement [i.e., ‘that here might be some substance to Russian grievances’ concerning the growth of NATO]". But Ms. Sarotte fails to understand that such an acknowledgement would give Russia a basis, a legal basis, to start to push back on the expansion of NATO. Ms. Savotte apparently thinks that size of NATO is fixed and unchangeable. But Erich Honecker said in January of 1989 that the Wall could stand for another 100 years. It was gone in ten months.
However, it is more than just NATO. Five countries that were in the Warsaw Pact, and subject to the Soviet Union, in 1989 are now in NATO. If NATO’s enlargement was improper, what happens to freedom and democracy in those countries?
Also, as I mentioned above, there are countries in NATO today that were part of the Soviet Union in 1989. If NATO’s enlargement was improper, what protects the freedom – and independence – of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? Are they to rely on the good intentions of the Russian government, the president of which said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the twentieth century?
The importance of legal agreements and legal bases for arguments cannot be underestimated. Consider the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The Soviet Union had been pushing for a conference on security in Europe for years. The Soviets wanted to gain recognition for the post-World War II boundaries in Europe, thus ratifying the Soviets’ territorial gains (from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania) and recognizing the division of Germany. The final agreement did recognize the boundaries and stated that borders should only be changed by peaceful means.*
But the Helsinki Accords were more than just boundaries and territory. In addition to political and economic matters, there was a third "basket" on cultural issues, which included human rights. In the third basket, the signatories agreed to, among other things:
"respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief"
"promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms"
"act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
At the time, many in the United States were opposed to the Helsinki Accords. They thought that the West was giving up somebody real, the agreement on borders, for mere words about human rights.
But those words wound up being very important. While the agreements were no more binding than previous agreements (or even the countries’ own laws and constitutions), they provided a new impetus for human rights throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Basket III became "the basis for the work of the Moscow Helsinki Group, an independent non-governmental organization created to monitor compliance [with] the Helsinki Accords."
In Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel and others founded Charter 77 to hold the Czechoslovak government to the promises it made at Helsinki. People throughout Eastern Europe could now point to their governments’ own agreements to allow them human rights. (See here.)
Obviously, the agreements in Basket III did not, by themselves, cause the Wall to come down and the Soviet Union to break up, but they did play a part in giving the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union a new hope, something to believe in. Basket III was important because there are times when words do matter.
And that is the problem with "acknowledging that there might be some substance to Russian grievances" concerning NATO’s enlargement. By doing so we would be giving Russia a legal basis for an argument to push back on NATO enlargement. We would also be creating doubts in the minds of people in eastern Europe and the Baltics as to whether we would really come to their aid if Russia did to them what it did to Georgia. The Russians have pressured Ukraine the last couple of winters over natural gas supplies. Do we have any reason to doubt that they would do the same, or something else, to other countries if they thought they had a chance of success – and if they had a legal basis for doing it?
The spread of freedom and democracy across Europe, and the enlargement of NATO, has been the great accomplishment of the last twenty years. We should not do anything that might put it at risk.
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* The United States specifically stated during the conference that it did not recognize the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other countries did the same.
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