Ambassador Ryan Crocker spoke at a meeting of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Monday evening. His topic was “The U.S. Role in Iraq’s Future.” In addition to being ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, Mr. Crocker was ambassador to Lebanon from 1990 to 1993, Kuwait from 1994 to 1997, Syria from 1998 to 2001, and Pakistan from 2004 to 2007, among other positions.
Ambassador Crocker’s speech was fascinating, as were the Q's and A's that followed. What I am going to do here is to list of some of what Ambassador Crocker said, almost in bullet-point fashion. Unfortunately, that loses the flow of his speech, but it’s all I can do. To the extent that I have misstated any of what Ambassador Crocker said, I apologize to both the reader and to Ambassador Crocker.
President Obama has said that, with the ending of our combat role in Iraq, we were turning the page. Ambassador Crocker said that many Americans have viewed it as closing the book.
Ambassador Crocker said that, in 2007, the United States’ “re-missioning” (his word) of our forces to protect civilians started a virtuous cycle. The Sunnis thought we had their back, so they went after the forces of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Shias noticed what the Sunnis were doing, and they went after extreme elements on their side.
The first round of elections in Iraq was important; the second round was more important. The losers complained, but then they went home.
Of all of the possible points of failure that could happen in Iraq, the failure of the “rule of law” could be the most likely possibility. 34 judges have been killed so far. It is a huge challenge.
There is a legacy of fear in Iraq, something that we in the U.S. cannot understand. The Sunnis are afraid of the future; will they be persecuted like they were in 2006 and 2007? The Shias are afraid of the past; they worry that the Baath will come back. And the Kurds are afraid of both the past and the future: Will Baghdad come back like it did? Ambassador Crocker said they would joke that Prime Minister Maliki saw a Baath behind every bush. But then you have to realize that, when Mr. Maliki left Iraq in 1979, he left a day ahead of his assassins.
Unlike the United States, with our two oceans and with Mexico and Canada as neighbors, Iraq lives in a rough neighborhood. Many of its neighbors would like to see a weak Iraq.
The U.S. has a critical role to play in Iraq’s future. Ambassador Crocker negotiated two agreements with the Iraqis in 2008. The Status of Forces Agreement provides for all U.S. forces to be gone by the end of 2011. While neither the Iraqis nor President Obama can (politically) extend this deadline, Ambassador Crocker hopes that there is a way to manage it so some U.S. forces can stay. He thinks that the American people would be okay with us staying as advisers as long as there are no casualties. (Like Korea.)
The other agreement was the Strategic Framework Agreement, covering things like trade, agriculture, economic matters, student exchanges, cultural matters, etc. This needs to be fully implemented.
We need to stay in Iraq because we are the one player that all Iraqis trust. We are assurance. You can really see it between the Arabs and the Kurds, but it is also true with other Iraqi groups, too. The Iraqis have learned to give in to us on things. They need to learn to give in to each other. But it will take time. Ambassador Crocker said that early in his time in Iraq, when major issues were discussed, he had to be in the room to get things agreed to. By the end of 2008, he would be available by phone, but he did not need to be in the room. While we can’t play this kind of mediating role forever, he doesn’t think we will be able to get it done by the end of 2011.
The Iraqis, with our help, have come to the point that a stable, sustainable, pluralistic democracy is possible – if we stay involved.
The U.S. needs strategic patience and a willingness to continue to provide resources to help the Iraqis. It will be fewer resources than we have provided in the past, but we still need to provide some.
Some U.S. forces need to stay in Iraq for a while. If all of our forces leave Iraq at the end of 2011, Iraq will have no ability to protect itself. This will be risky, especially vis-à-vis Iran. Iraq will not be getting things like planes, etc., until 2013 and later.
Ambassador Crocker concluded that while we have turned the page in Iraq, it was only the end of an early chapter in the book. What happens now will depend in how engaged we will stay, how intelligent we will be. Ambassador Crocker was (is) very concerned about the effect of the budgetary pressures in Washington on our foreign policy.
A comment: When Ambassador Crocker was making his comment about staying engaged in Iraq, I thought of a comment that was made recently on one of my posts on Libya: “Where is Charlie Wilson when we need him!!!” This comment may be even more appropriate here. The movie, “Charlie Wilson’s War,” ended with the Russians defeated, and Charlie Wilson pushing for money in Congress for schools and other non-military aid for Afghanistan. But Congress didn’t care anymore. The Russians were gone, and we lost interest. We didn’t stay involved. And look at what happened. We need to avoid forfeiting all that has been accomplished in Iraq so far because we lose interest and won’t stay involved.
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Ambassador Crocker noted that the President of Iraq was invited to Kuwait for the recent twentieth anniversary celebration of the liberation of Kuwait. When Ambassador Crocker saw him there, he said he was surprised to see him. The President of Iraq said he had been surprised to be invited and that when the invitation came, he accepted it before Kuwait could realize they made a mistake.
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Ambassador Crocker said that if you want to see how things are breaking in Lebanon, watch Whalid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze. If he is talking about the West and NATO, etc., that is a good sign. If he is spending time in Damascus, that is not good. Lately, he has been doing the latter.
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The United States can take some credit for the military stepping aside in Egypt and Tunisia.
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The Saudis view the Shias like the mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, viewed Blacks in 1952.
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The most significant historical moment in Syrian history, or at least recent Syrian history, was February of 1982, when Hafez al-Assad used three divisions to bombard the town of Hama and the Muslim Brotherhood members located there. The attacks not only eliminated the Muslim Brotherhood but also thousands of civilians. The bad blood between Assad’s Alawi sect and the Sunnis continues to today. In Syria, February 1982 is always just the day before yesterday.
There is the potential for a vicious civil war in Syria. Certain military units have been organized specifically as regime protection units. They would not expect to survive an overthrow of Bashar al-Assad. Some might think that a civil war in Syria would be good. But a Sunni-majority government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood could be very bad for Israel.
Also, the current regime might, in a last ditch attempt to survive, start a war with Israel and them argue that anybody who opposed the government was a friend of Israel’s.
A comment: Consider Argentina’s invading the Falklands in 1982 in an attempt to rally the country and maintain its own survival.
Syria is the wildest card in a whole pack of wild cards in the Middle East.
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