I have, over the last month, written at least eight posts on Russia, Crimea, and Ukraine, with thoughts on NATO and the Baltics, too. My comments on what the U.S. has actually done, as opposed to our statements of policy, have not been very complementary. Saturday’s post was one of those. After re-reading Saturday’s post*, I thought I ought to write something more positive, saying what we should be doing, instead of merely complaining about what we are not doing.
In looking back at my posts, though, I realized that I had already done that on March 26. Actually, I didn’t do it myself. I quoted from an article in The Wall Street Journal by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and he did it. Here is some of what former Secretary Gates said:
“Europe's reliance on Russian oil and gas must be reduced, and truly meaningful economic sanctions must be imposed, knowing there may be costs to the West as well. NATO allies bordering Russia must be militarily strengthened and reinforced with alliance forces; and the economic and cyber vulnerabilities of the Baltic states to Russian actions must be reduced (especially given the number of Russians and Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia).
Western investment in Russia should be curtailed; Russia should be expelled from the G-8 and other forums that offer respect and legitimacy; the U.S. defense budget should be restored to the level proposed in the Obama administration's 2014 budget a year ago, and the Pentagon directed to cut overhead drastically, with saved dollars going to enhanced capabilities, such as additional Navy ships; U.S. military withdrawals from Europe should be halted; and the EU should be urged to grant associate agreements with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.”
We have done one of the things former Secretary Gates recommended, partially. He said that Russia should be expelled from the G-8. Russia has not been expelled, but it has been suspended. Maybe that shows a little bit of the problem with our response so far and what we need to do in the future.
Instead of taking the stronger action of expelling Russia from the G-8, they were only suspended. I think this goes to what seems to be the White House’s approach to the problem: a gradual escalation of pressure as Russia does more and more. As President Obama said in Seoul, Korea, on Friday, he wants “to keep some arrows in our quiver” in case things get worse.
I would have thought that the Vietnam War would have showed us the problems with gradual escalation. If it didn’t, let me restate them. In my post of April 15, I commented on an article entitled “Is Estonia Worth a War?” I certainly don’t want a war over Estonia, but then I don’t want to go to war at all. However, the key to not going to war, whether over Estonia or something else, is to make sure the other side (in this case Russia) knows, with absolute certainty, what we will do in response to what they do. If we make our position clear enough and commitment strong enough, from the beginning, then we won’t have to go to war because the other side won’t risk it – because there will be no doubt in their mind what we will do.
Wars often happen when mixed signals are sent. Consider Korea**, the Falklands***, and even the 1990-91 Gulf War****. Maybe they would have happened even without the mixed signals, but there were mixed signals.
Let me expand a little bit on former Secretary Gates’ list. In the past, we have been hesitant to develop contingency plans for the protection of the Baltics or to send forces to the Baltics for the fear of provoking Russia. Well, at this point, we need to worry more about misleading Russia as to our lines in the sand, than we do about provoking Russia. Russia needs to have no doubt what we will do.
Similarly, as I said, we should not gradually escalate our responses to Russia’s actions. I am not suggesting we need to be unnecessarily belligerent. What I am suggesting is that doing more now will mean that we don’t have to do as much later.
I understand that there may be some limits on what countries in Europe can or will do on sanctions. (See, for example, here.) If that is true, then we need to figure out what else we can do in the meantime. We can send more planes and more troops to countries that want them to come. Our troops aren’t going to invade anybody, but if we have people on the ground and if we have real, meaningful plans in place to respond to threats, then we won’t need to use them, because people will know where we have drawn the line.*****
I realize that, in some cases, this will seem unfair. Some countries in Europe aren’t pulling their weight, and that’s not right. But even if it’s unfair, it is cheaper for us to do what we have to do to make our position clear, and believable, than to deal with the alternative in the future because we didn’t do enough now.
War is avoided, and peace is maintained, through strength and obvious determination – backed by real actions and commitments followed through on. The time to start is now – because we don’t know how much time we have left.
---------
* Which was posted at 11:11 pm Saturday evening, thus making it my “Saturday evening post”. Sorry. I could not resist.
** On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech to the National Press Club in which he outlined our “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific. South Korea was outside that perimeter. See, inter alia, Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 1982, p. 30.
*** Among other things, in 1981, the British Ministry of Defence decided to withdraw the patrol ship Endurance from the South Atlantic the next year. Also in 1981, a new British Nationality Bill was passed that denied full British citizenship to British colonials who did not have at least one grandparent born in Britain. Since many Falkland Islanders had been there for three or four generations, many of them lost their claim to full British citizenship. See, Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 1983, p. 42-44.
**** Some have argued that, in a July 25, 1990 meeting with Saddam Hussein, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie was not strong enough as to what the United States would do if Iraq invaded Kuwait, which it did a week later. See here.
***** The Pentagon did announce last week that it would be sending companies (which have about 150 troops in them) from the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, which is based in Italy, to Poland and each of the Baltics for training exercises. That is certainly better than nothing, but it’s not good enough. It’s gradual escalation instead of serious commitment.
Comments