Dealing With North Korea: Richard Nixon-Style

Failing with respect to North Korea is a pattern with recent presidents.  Bill Clinton signed an Agreed Framework with the father of Kim Jong Un.  North Korea violated it.  George W. Bush seemed to be getting a little somewhere with financial sanctions, but then we backed off in order to open negotiations with North Korea.  The negotiations didn’t work.  Neither did Barack Obama’s strategic patience. 

On the other hand, if one of the reasons North Korea is developing nuclear weapons is because they are a little paranoid, then I am not sure all of the Trump administration's threats and tweets are helping the situation.  If we’re not careful, we might scare Kim Jong Un into doing something first, which would not be good.  Please understand I am not saying we shouldn’t do anything.  I’m just saying that maybe we could do it a little more quietly.

Robert Gates had some interesting ideas in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal for trying to convince China to do something with respect to North Korea.¹  But regardless of what policy you think is good, one of the keys in getting it to work is doing it behind the scenes.  Do it quietly.  Let China, etc., have the chance to agree to what we are suggesting without looking like they are giving in to our pressure.

I previously wrote about how Richard Nixon handled the Soviet Union’s attempt to build a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba, in 1970.  Instead of going all Cuban-missile-crisis on it when the problem arose, President Nixon worked behind the scenes.  As I said in my post, “[p]rompt action, private channels, respect for the other side, and skillful diplomacy averted a crisis, and we achieved what we wanted.”

It is too late to be that circumspect with respect to North Korea, though toning down the threats (and tweets) wouldn’t hurt.  Our actions should be strong, but our talk doesn’t have to be.  If we really want China to help with respect to North Korea, then private, behind-the-scenes diplomacy, with mutual respect for each side’s needs and importance, is the best way to do it.
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¹ If you can’t get around the WSJ-pay wall, here is a short summary:

“[T]he U.S. would make China the following offer: Washington is prepared to recognize the North Korean regime and forswear a policy of regime change, as it did when resolving the Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union; is prepared to sign a peace treaty with North Korea; and would be prepared to consider some changes in the structure of military forces in South Korea.
In return, the U.S. would demand hard limits on the North Korean nuclear and missile program, essentially freezing it in place, enforced by the international community and by China itself.
… [T]he North Koreans would have to agree to invasive inspections that could insure a limited nuclear stockpile …, as well as … to ensure they aren’t developing more weapons or further capabilities for delivery.
... [T]he U.S. would [also] present a tougher alternative for China: ‘If that is not an outcome you can accept, we are going to take steps in Asia you hate.’
… [T]he U.S. would ‘heavily populate Asia with missile defenses.’ … [T]he U.S. would declare that it would shoot down ‘anything we think looks like a launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile’ from North Korea.
In short, lacking a diplomatic solution, ‘whatever means we need to take to contain this regime, we will take.’”