Gerard Baker’s column in The Times (London) on November 10, 2006, was entitled "Four reasons for optimism after Bush’s drubbing – as long as you’re not Iraqi." I hope the last part of it is not true, but I fear it may be. I have this idea for a political cartoon. It is a picture of an American voter (at least a liberal Democratic voter) holding up a purple-stained finger to a group of huddled Iraqis. It’d be his/her middle finger.
The "me-ism" of the certain parts of the American public, combined with the Bush-hatred of the American left, could prove the death knell for too many Iraqis who trusted us. For many people, especially on the left, their belief that we were wrong to go into Iraq means we should leave Iraq as soon as possible, regardless of what has happened since 2003. It is as if leaving will mean we were never there, so it is okay to just leave.
For others it is their hatred of Bush because of the Florida recount or his smirk or he talks about God (although Clinton talked about God more and that was okay – but then anything Bill Clinton did was okay) or he’s just not one of them. In any case, Bush took us in (all those Democrats who voted for it are irrelevant because it was Bush’s fault the CIA got it wrong about the weapons of mass destruction), so it is Bush’s fault if anything bad happens when we leave.
Some of those who want us to leave say that it is okay to just leave because the fighting is only going on because we are there. If we leave, the fighting will end – or at least decrease. If we leave, the terrorists will leave, and everybody else will just stop shooting. This is, of course, exactly what the liberals and Democrats said about Vietnam and Cambodia: If we would leave, the killing would end. If wasn’t true then (just ask the boat people of Vietnam and the survivors of the killing fields in Cambodia), and it won’t be true now.
But it doesn’t matter to the people who want to get out – now – because Bush is bad and when it comes to the Iraqis, they just don’t care.
But if we can’t just leave, what should we do?
First, we need to remember we were right to go in. The arguments for going in were right back in 2003, and they are still right today. Everybody thought Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. The fact that it appears he did not have them, or at least very many of them, does not change the fact that decisions in 2003 had to be based on what we knew in 2003 – and what we knew then was that Saddam Hussein had WMDs.
Also, in 2003 sanctions appeared to be were failing. And boy, were we right on that one. In fact, we did not realize just how corrupt the whole food-for-peace process was back then and how many holes the sanctions had in them. If we had not gone in, the sanctions would have collapsed, whether publicly or privately. And once they had collapsed, Saddam was ready to go out and get WMD even if he did not have them before.
So we had to go in. And the invasion proved that Rumsfeld, who wanted to fight the next war, instead of the last war (as generals usually do), was right in how the invasion should be fought. We did not need to fight like we did in Europe in 1945 or even Kuwait in 1991. But while Rumsfeld was right on how many troops we needed for the invasion, what followed indicates he was wrong on how many we needed for the peace. We were not prepared for what came after the invasion. It is not Rumsfeld’s fault we were surprised by what happened. Surprises happen all the time in war, but it was his fault that we were not prepared to react to surprises and that we failed to react effectively to the surprises that did happen.
So what do we do now? While I do not know what policies would definitely have worked after the invasion or what would necessarily work better now, I would say this:
First, in spite of what the "me generation" wants to do, we cannot abandon the people of Iraq like we abandoned the people of South Vietnam. Just because some of the Iraqi leaders are bad does not mean the Iraqi people are. We owe the Iraqi people something. We owe them a chance. However, just because we owe the Iraqi people a chance, does not mean we should blindly "stay the course." "Staying the course" is right when it means doing our duty and keeping our promises. "Staying the course" does not mean following the same old policies if those policies are not working. Even though the goal stays the same, the policies should change if they are not working.
Second, there is a mistake too many of our political leaders make. In Vietnam we ignored our military leaders. Now, it seems, most politicians pay them too much heed. Politicians too often say, when it comes to military matters, that they will do what the generals say; that they will take the generals’ advice. Bush always says that it is up to the generals how many troops we have in Iraq and when they can come home.
No, it is not. There is no single military answer. There are lots of military answers. Also, the generals are not always right. They can’t always be right because they don’t always agree. Not all generals are equally competent, and some are just plain incompetent. It is the President’s job, with the help of his advisers, to figure out which generals have the right military answer.
If you do not believe me, ask Abraham Lincoln. If he had not kept firing generals until he finally found some good ones, the Union would have lost the Civil War. In Vietnam William Westmoreland wanted to fight a war of attrition against a fanatic foe that did not care how many people it lost. But Creighton Abrams had a different strategy; he just did not have enough time or support to fully implement it. (There is a reason the main Army battle tank is called the Abrams and not the Westmoreland.)
Third, this means that, when we were surprised, when things did not go well, we needed to try new policies. When policies continued to not go well, we needed to try new people. While Rumsfeld was right at the beginning, after enough mistakes, we needed to try somebody else. Generals needed to be replaced, too. On the other hand, instead of rotating the generals and other officers through Iraq (as we did in Vietnam), once we found good ones, once they knew what they were doing, we needed to keep them there, instead of sending them home so somebody else could have a chance. We are, after all, trying to win a war, not cross-train a bunch of administrators.
So, what do we need to do? As I said, I do not have an answer, but here are some guidelines to help determine, and judge, what we should do:
We must fulfill our duty to the Iraqi people.
We need to let the Iraqi leaders know that our duty is to the Iraqi people, not to them.
When policies don’t work, we need to change the policies.
If policies continue to not work, we need to change the people.
When we find the right people, we need to keep them where they can build on what they know.
We need to make sure that the way we leave Iraq actually helps the Iraqi people, the world, and us, instead of making things worse.
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