The View from Right Field

Gaffes, Red Lines, and Credibility

[This is a follow up and elaboration on my post of March 26, 2022.¹ ]

In the 2020 presidential election, I didn’t vote for Joe Biden even though I wanted Donald Trump to lose.  I couldn’t bring myself to vote for President Biden because, as Robert Gates said in 2014, “I think he's been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.”^2,3  Fortunately, I live in Illinois, so my vote was not necessary for President Biden to win Illinois’s electoral votes. 

Which brings me to President Biden’s recent “gaffe tour” of Europe.  Michel Kinsley famously defined a gaffe as “when a politician tells the truth – some obvious truth he isn't supposed to say."  President Biden gave us two great examples of this on his trip.  First, he said, apparently unscripted, that Vladimir Putin was a “war criminal.”  That is probably true, but how is it helpful?  We need to get the war in Ukraine over.  How does making Vladimir Putin think he might be prosecuted as a war criminal help do that?⁴

In 2013, John Kerry Said Assad “Has to Go.” In 2022, Joe Biden Said Putin “Cannot Remain in Power.”

On February 25, 2013, then-Secretary of State John Kerry said that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ‘has to go.”  Nine years later, John Kerry is gone, but President Assad is still in power.  Today, President Biden said, “For God’s sake, this man [i.e., Vladimir Putin] cannot remain in power.” 

Since President Biden said President Putin “cannot remain in power,” I hope he means it, and I hope he knows how he is going to get it done.  Because this is not something you say, unless you both mean it and know how you are going to accomplish it.

Covid-19. Ukraine. Do We Ever Learn Anything?

When Covid-19, then known as the coronavirus, hit in early 2020, we weren’t ready.  We didn’t have enough personal protective equipment, our medical systems were inadequate, the plans we had for pandemics didn’t work, etc.  Things were a mess.  On April 26, 2020, I wrote a long post entitled “Preparing for the ‘Next’ Coronavirus – Whatever It Is. But Will We?”  But the post was not talking about just the next virus.  It was asking about the next emergency, the next disaster, the next big problem, whatever it was.  In the conclusion of my post, I said this:

“Robustness.  Resiliency.  Nimbleness.  These are what we need if we are to be ready for the emergencies and disasters that will happen, though we don’t know which ones or when.  Most of all, however, we need leaders who understand the importance of these qualities and who can provide the leadership to help us secure them and maintain them.”

“I Need Ammunition, Not a Ride.” And Other Comments on America and Ukraine

If there is a contest for quote of the year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has already won it with his response to America’s offer to fly him out of the country (or maybe to Lviv, in far western Ukraine, I’m not sure) after the Russian invasion started.  Maybe we thought he would want to leave, like Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani did when we abandoned Afghanistan.  But President Zelensky didn’t.  Which leads to my first comment:

1. Just like in Afghanistan, our intelligence in Ukraine was really bad.  In Afghanistan, we thought the government could last for months after we left.  Instead, it collapsed before we were even gone.  It was a total intelligence failure.

     It was much the same in Ukraine, except in the opposite direction.  While we got it right that Russia was going to invade, we were totally wrong about how well the Russian army would do and we were totally wrong about how well the Ukrainian army would defend its country.  We saw the Russian army as experienced and well-equipped, and we thought they would roll over the Ukrainians.  We saw the Ukrainian army as weak and unprepared, and we thought they wouldn’t be able to stand up to the Russians.  Both of these were wrong, and that was important because those intelligence failures may have affected our policy choices.

Russia Invading Ukraine in 2014 versus Russia Invading Ukraine in 2022

I was thinking about the way Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 versus the way they are doing it now.  In 2014, Russia’s invasion of Crimea was by “little green men”; i.e., soldiers not wearing Russian uniforms and with no insignias.  Their vehicles had no markings.  When Russia went into the Donbas in 2014, it was much the same.  The Russians said it was just local people.  When Russian soldiers were sighted in the Donbas, the response was that they were just on vacation. 

But this year, the Russians haven’t tried to hide anything.  It’s Russian soldiers, Russian tanks, Russian planes.  It’s clear and obvious. 

What We Need in Ukraine Is a Policy Backed by Strength and Credibility

Several thoughts on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Actually, I should say Russia’s “renewed” invasion of Ukraine, since Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 and Russian troops were involved in the supposed rebel outbreaks in the Donbas, etc.¹

First, before the renewed invasion, I listened to podcasts with diplomats, reporters, etc., talking about the situation in Ukraine.  Since the invasion, I have found those discussions less useful.  The best people to listen to now are military people.  I have learned a lot from the comments of Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.) in this program at the Atlantic Council and of former National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster (ret.) in the “Goodfellows” programs at the Hoover Institution.  This is, after all, a war.  To understand what is happening and what our options are, among the best people to listen to are the generals.  If you don’t know the military situation and the military options, you can’t make good decisions.  The military doesn’t make the decisions, but they give some of the most important information to those who do.

Ukraine and the Brittleness of Autocracy, the Suddenness of Change

On January 24, I wrote a post I titled “Illinois in 2021 Reminds Us of the Suddenness of Change and the Brittleness of Autocracy.”  The post had two main points.  The first was: “[T]he suddenness of change: the unexpected never happens – until it does.  Things seem like they will never change – until they do.”  The second was: “Authoritarian regimes are often a lot more brittle than they seem.  They look strong, and they look like they are going to last for a long time.  Until all of a sudden, something happens.”

With respect to the second point, I talked about East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1989.  I could have also talked about Argentina in 1982.  On April 2, 1982, the Argentine dictatorship under General Galtiera invaded and seized the Falklands from the United Kingdom.  I doubt they understood their opponent in British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.  On April 5, a British task force set sail.  On May 1, British forces landed in the Falklands (8,000 miles from Britain).  On June 14, Argentine forces surrendered.  In Argentina, the Galtiera dictatorship collapsed, and a democratic government was elected in 1983.  In other words, the brittleness of authoritarian regimes and the suddenness of change. 

Former National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster (ret.) talked about the former on “Face the Nation” today (see beginning at 3:10):

Donald Trump Praises Vladimir Putin – As Putin Invades Ukraine

One would like to think that Donald Trump’s praise of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the very moment Russia is invading Ukraine would be enough to finally put enough Republicans off former President Trump, but I fear it may not.

Note: I will leave it to others to explain why former President Trump said these things.  I don’t know if there is a reason other than, for former President Trump, everything is always about him.  I doubt there is another reason, but if somebody can come up with one, more power to them.

Ukraine: It’s Not What You Say; It’s What You Do

Coming back from the Munich Security Conference last Wednesday, the day before Russia invaded Ukraine, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said: “This is our moment. … This is a Sudetenland.”  But, as I said in the title of this post, it’s not what you say, it’s what you do.

Is Speaker Pelosi willing to spend a little less on social programs, so we can spend more on defense?  Is she willing to authorize more drilling on federal lands, get more gas pipelines built, and fast-track the construction of liquified natural gas terminals in the U.S., so U.S. LNG can help replace Russian natural gas in Europe?

That is what you do if “this is our moment”; if “this is a Sudetenland.”  Saying it and not doing anything is what you do if it’s just PR.

Is Putin Really Invading Ukraine Because NATO Expanded?

As Vladimir Putin continues Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,¹ we hear a number of people saying that it is the fault (or at least mostly the fault) of the United States and the West.  We promised the USSR in 1990, and then Russia later, that NATO would not expand eastward.  Even if the promise was not formally written, it was implied.  The expansion of NATO threatened Russia.  They felt surrounded.  Etc.

Which may sound plausible.  The question, however, is whether it really would have made any difference if NATO had not expanded.  If countries in eastern Europe had not started applying to NATO in the 1990s, would Russia’s economic reforms have worked?  Would Boris Yeltsin have been able to create a real democracy in Russia?  Would the oligarchs have not stolen the country blind?  Russia’s internal chaos in the 1990s was not caused by the expansion of NATO.  It was caused by Russian incompetence.